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INTRODUCTION
I.
When business parties enter into binding agreements, it is in their
interest not merely to consider the immediate dynamics of the exchange,
but to anticipate the ways in which a changing world might affect their
obligations. Individual circumstances are only a baseline in contract
negotiations. In order to achieve maximum security for the parties, the
agreement must be attuned to political and economic realities.
In the area of export trade finance, one of the most significant
external influences which parties need to take into account today is the
impending European Monetary Union (EMU). The EMU, scheduled to be
launched in 1999, is the dramatic culmination of sustained efforts to unify
economic and monetary policies in Europe. It signals the death of various
national currencies, which are to be succeeded by a single monetary unit.
At this time, only a minority of EU member states perform well enough
economically to qualify for the EMU.1 Nevertheless, the EMU is expected
to proceed according to schedule, inducting the qualified countries
immediately, followed by the other countries as they become eligible.'
The obsolescence of national currencies poses some technical
difficulties, because many contracts stipulate a specific currency in which
payment is to be made. Part I of this paper explores the currency
problems that could arise as a consequence of the single currency, focusing
in particular on countertrade and forfaiting transactions. Part II of the
paper discusses the identifying features of forfait financing. Part III
addresses counterpurchase agreements and bilateral clearing agreements.
Part IV then examines the history and technical aspects of the EMU. Part
V anticipates currency disputes related to forfaiting transactions and
countertrade. Finally, Part VI concludes that business parties should pay
close attention to the external influence of the EMU when they coordinate
their mutual obligations.

1. These include France, Germany, Austria, Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands.
See infra note 160.
2. See infra notes 153 and 154.
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FORFAITING AS A METHOD OF EXPORT FINANCE

A. Identifying Features
As with other forms of export finance, forfaiting is a mechanism
designed to secure credit for buyers with the least possible risk to sellers. 3
Exporters find forfaiting appealing because cash is received shortly after
shipment.' Buyers find it helpful because it enables them to purchase
goods without having to tender immediate payment.- Estimates indicate
that approximately two percent of all international trade involves
forfaiting .6 This method of finance is now gaining acceptance in the
United States, where many European forfait houses have established
representative offices.'

In a forfaiting transaction, the exporter sells export receivables at a
discount to a forfaiter in return for cash.' Trade instruments used for this
purpose include promissory notes, guaranteed bills of exchange (i.e., "per
aval"), and letters of credit.9 The debt is ordinarily paid in semi-annual
installments, each of which is evidenced either by a negotiable instrument,
or by a letter of credit.' 0 When the exporter sells the negotiable

3.
See CHARLES J. GMUR ET AL., TRADE FINANCING 117 (1981) [hereinafter Gmur];
Elnora Uzzelle, ForfaitingShould Not Be Overlooked As An Innovative Means of Export Finance,
BUS. AM., Feb. 1995, at 20 [hereinafter Uzzelle].
4.

See Uzzelle, supra note 3, at 20.
5.
See A. I. Trade Finance, Inc. v. Centro Internationale Handelsbank AG, 1992 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 15100, 1992 WL 296419 at 2 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
6.

See Uzzelle, supra note 3, at 22.
7.
See Id. at 20. Forfaiting was developed in the wake of World War II by Swiss
financiers in order to facilitate the sale of West German capital assets to Eastern Europe. Id.
Today, the center of the forfaiting market is London. Id.; Edmond Tavernier, Legal Aspects of
Forfaiting, 11 INT'L Bus. LAW 25 (Oct. 1983) (describing the role of forfaiting in U.S. grain
exports) [hereinafter Tavernier].
8.

See A. I. Trade Finance, Inc. v. Petra Bank, 989 F.2d 76, 78 (2d Cir. 1993).
9.
See Tavernier, supra note 7, at 27-28. A per aval guarantee by a bank is "an
unconditional irrevocable and freely assignable obligation of the bank, not only as guarantor, but
as co-obligor as well." Uzzelle, supra note 3, at 20. Thus, the bank as guarantor is required to
make payment without respect to any nonperformance issues that might afflict the underlying
transaction. See Handelsbank AG, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15100, at 2 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 29,

1992). A letter of credit is "an undertaking issued by a bank for the account of the buyer (the
Applicant) or for its own account, to pay the [seller] the value of the Draft and/or documents

provided that the terms and conditions of the [letter of credit] are complied with." CHARLES DEL
BUSTO, ICC GUIDE TO DOCUMENTARY CREDIT OPERATIONS 22 (1994).
10.

See Uzzelle, supra note 3, at 20.
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instruments, the forfaiter may hold them until they mature, or resell them
in a secondary market."
Since the forfaiter buys the instruments from the exporter on a
non-recourse basis, all of the risks related to foreign debt are shifted from
the exporter to the forfaiter.' 2 Recourse against the exporter is only
The first is where the
available in three extraordinary situations."
instruments are in some way defective.1 Recourse may also be had if the
guarantee by the bank was not valid when it was made.' 5 Finally, the
forfaiter has recourse if the transaction was "not as represented.",'

B. ForExample
Suppose Spacely Sprockets, a United States exporter, enters into a17
sales agreement with Compratore di Milano, an Italian buyer.
Compratore agrees to purchase 10,000 sprockets in return for a six-year
credit on the sale. As part of the arrangement, Compratore secures a
guarantee of payment from its local bank. Next, Spacely ships the

11. See Petra Bank, 989 F.2d at 78. The secondary markets are quite active and involve
A
heavy trading of notes. See HOWARD PALMER, INTERNATIONAL TRADE FINANCE:
PRACTMONER'S GUIDE 50 (1995).

[The products and the objectives of this market are very different from those of the
original forfaiters. The participants in this secondary market view any item generated
in the primary cycle (as a means to finance the export) merely as a risk asset to be
endorsed and traded as a marketable security. Bankers participating simply buy risk,
invariably on a non-recourse basis, and judge that risk by its country of origin, the
credit status of the guaranteeing or avalizing party and their portfolio management
objectives. Popular risk, such as good quality Chinese paper, could change hands as
many as 10 times in the secondary market. Id. at 51.
12. See Gmur, supra note 3, at 117.
13. See A.I. Finance, Inc. v. Centro Internationale Hjandelsbank, AG, 1992 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 15100, at 68 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 1992).
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. See also Eugene A. Ludwig & Michael J. Coursey, The Export Trade Note: A
New Instrument for International Trade, 16 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 381 (1986) [hereinafter
Ludwig & Coursey]:
[IIt is unclear under European civil law whether the exporter, despite its endorsement
of the note without recourse, implicitly covenants to the note-purchaser that the note it
isselling is a valid note, validly executed by the importer and validly [guaranteed] by
the importer's bank. Thus, the exporter in a forfait transaction may ultimately be
liable to the note-purchaser if the note proves to be invalid in form or substance.
Id. at 387 (citing Tavernier, Legal Aspects of Forfaiting, 11 INT'L Bus. LAW 25, 28-29 (Oct.
1983)).
17. This example is based on an illustration which appeared in Elnora Uzzelle's article.
See Uzzelle, supra note 3, at 21.
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sprockets to Italy and endorses the guaranteed negotiable instruments on a
non-recourse basis in .favor of Fred's Forfaiting. Fred then pays to
Spacely the discounted proceeds in cash. Spacely is now out of the
picture, although it is still responsible for the quality of the goods."
Meanwhile, Fred has absorbed all of the risks attending the transaction:
the credit risk of Compratore's bank; the risk of exchange rate
fluctuations; and the political risks of doing business with an Italian firm.' 9
Fred now has the option of transferring those risks by selling the notes to
another bank or to a private investor.m0
Under a forfaiting agreement, credit terms can range from two
months to ten years. 2' However, the normal range is between 180 days and
about six years." In general, the amount of time granted for repayment
corresponds to the risks involved.3 Thus, high risk transactions entail
short repayment terms and high discount rates, while transactions of low
risk imply the reverse.u4
III.

COUNTERTRADE

Countertrade is a term used generically to describe a variety of
international trade agreements.Y The most common forms of countertrade
are counterpurchase agreements, buy-back agreements and barter.26 While
barter and buy-back agreements typically do not require cash payment, 2
other countertrade techniques often do?
In light of the rapidly
approaching changes in Europe's currency system, this section outlines two
18. Id.
19. See Uzzelle, supra note 3, at 21.
20. See supra note 11.
21. See Uzzelle, supra note 3, at 21.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. "For sales to Japan, Canada, and France, terms may reach five years and the
discount to yield hovers around 6.75%. However, sales to Pakistan may yield a one year term
limit with a discount rate of 7.5%, reflecting the perceived risk." Id.
25. See generally Cedric Guyot, Countertrade Contracts in International Business, 20
INT'L LAW 921, 922-24 (1986) [hereinafter Guyot].
26. See Steven Rinaldi, Can United States Anti-Dumping Law Be Effectively Applied to
CountertradeTransactions?, 19 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 441, 442 (1987).
27. Id. In a barter transaction, the parties exchange goods of equal value. Id. In a buyback transaction, one trading partner exports technology and equipment in order to construct a
plant in another country, and in return receives a predetermined supply of the plant's ultimate
output. Id. at 444.
28. See S. Douglas Nugent, U.S. Countertrade Policy: Is It Economically Sound?, 19
GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 829, 830-34 (1985) [hereinafter Nugent].
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counterpurchase agreements and bilateral clearing

A. Counterpurchase
In a counterpurchase agreement, the parties enter into multiple
contracts, and the value of the reciprocal deliveries need not be
equivalent." The first contract is simply a cash-for-goods transaction.30
The second contract prescribes the conditions of the counterpurchase, i.e.,
it covers the original exporter's obligation to purchase goods from the
original buyer.' The final contract, known as a protocol, links the first
two agreements. 2 This protocol is frequently incorporated into the
counterpurchase contract."
The two essential purchase agreements are discrete transactions
and involve separate payments of currency.Y
The performance of
deliveries and payments is ordinarily spread out over a period of one to
five years.31 To illustrate, a German telecommunications company might
sell hardware to a buyer in the Republic of Malawi for cash. This initial
purchase would then be linked to a reciprocal purchase agreement. The
German company would thereby assume an obligation for the subsequent
purchase of some commodity, such as limestone or uranium.
B. BilateralClearingAgreements
Under a bilateral clearing agreement, two countries agree to extend
mutual lines of credit and trade certain quantities of each other's goods
during a specified period of time.36 In other words, one country purchases
goods from the other and the price of the goods are debited from its line of
37
credit.
When the clearing period expires, there is often an imbalance
between the amounts of credit used by each country." In such a case, the

29. See William D. Zeller, Countertrade, the GAT,
11 HASTINGS INT'L & CoMP. L. REv. 247, 251 (1988).

30.
3i.
32.
33.

Id.
Id.
Id.
See Guyot, supra note 25, at 930.

34. Id.
35. Id.

36. See Nugent, supra note 28, at 833.
37. Id.
38. Id.

and the Theory of the Second Best,
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greater-consuming country is obligated to pay any residual difference to
the lesser-consuming country. 9 For example, if Austria shares a clearing
agreement with Romania, and if at the end of the clearing period Austria
has imported more goods from Romania than Romania has imported from
Austria, then Austria will be responsible for its outstanding residual debt.40
Whether the transaction in question involves a clearing agreement,
a counterpurchase, or a forfait financing, parties to agreements with
medium and long-term credit terms are advised to consider their possible
exposure to risks related to the steady advance of a unified system of
currency in Europe. The following section describes the forces propelling
the new regime, the concomitant technical details and the arguments for
and against its consummation.
IV. THE EUROPEAN MONETARY UNION
In 1957, the concept of a unified economic and monetary structure
in Europe was formally posited in Article 3(g) of the Treaty of Rome.4 '
From 1957 until 1972, the Bretton-Woods Agreement represented the
principal attempt to stabilize European currencies relative to one another.41
Under this regime, the fluctuations in exchange rates on foreign markets
were subject to tight controls in the participating countries. 3 However,
recessionary pressures in the late 1960's and early 1970's forced the
39. Id.
40. Id. Romania would also have the option of selling its credit to a third party at a
discount. Id. at 833-34.
41. The Treaty of Rome was signed by France, Germany, Italy, and the Benelux
countries, and was ratified by each of those states as of 1958. See AURTHUR I. BLOOMFIELD ET
AL., EUROPEAN MONETARY UNIFICATION AND ITS MEANING FOR THE UNITED STATES 1
(Lawrence B. Krause & Walter S. Salant eds., 1973) [hereinafter Bloomfield]. This treaty
provided for the dissolution of restrictions on the free movement of capital among the
participating countries, and for the erection of a single customs union. Id. Article 2 of the
Treaty proclaimed that a common market was to be achieved, and that the economic policies of
the signatories were to be harmonized. See John P. Flaherty & Maureen E. Lally-Green, The
European Union: Where is it Now?, 34 DUQ. L. REV. 923, 937 (Summer 1996) [hereinafter
Flaherty & Lally-Green]. Article 3 provided the instrumental details, including: (1) the
coordination of a single external commercial and tariff policy; (2) the elimination of barriers to
the free movement of labor, capital, goods, and services; (3) the development of common policy
in certain areas of the economy such as agriculture and transportation; (4) the unification of
economic and monetary policy; (5) the harmonization of the various laws of the signatories in
order to nurture the common market; (6) the establishment of a European Social Fund and a
European Investment Bank to promote employment and commercial expansion; and (7) the
increase of trade with other countries and territories. Id.
42. The participating countries included France, Germany, Italy, and the Benelux
countries. See Bloomfield, supra note 41, at 22-23.
43. Id.
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original participants to withdraw from the agreement in order to
rehabilitate their individual economies." The abandonment of BrettonWoods resulted in pronounced instability in exchange rates in Europe on
the markets for goods and capital suffered accordingly.41
A. The European Monetary System
Partly inspired by the lessons learned from Bretton-Woods, the
current effort to maintain stable markets and exchange rates is known as
the European Monetary System (EMS)." The EMS is far more ambitious
than Bretton-Woods, and contemplates the coordination of fiscal and
monetary policy as well as the stabilization of currency.47 Beyond these
objectives, the EMS was also conceived as a vehicle for the establishment
of a single currency that might eventually become suitable for international
trade .4
The push for a single currency can be traced to the Werner Plan of
1970, which set forth in detail the implications of a European Monetary
Union.4 9 This plan sought to eliminate restrictions on the movement of
capital, and to advance the goal of policy coordination.- In 1979, this
philosophy found expression as the European Economic Community
adopted the EMS.-'
Technically, the EMS is "an agreement among central banks to
manage intra-community exchange rates and to finance exchange market
interventions. " 2 This system includes three operative components. 3 First,
member states are required to limit fluctuations in exchange rates through
44.

See Susan B. Shulman, A Rapid or Evolutionary Approach: The EEC's Adoption of

the ECU as a Common Currency, 12 J. INT'L L. BUS. 392, 407 (1991) [hereinafter Shulman].
45.

See Bloomfield, supra note 41, at 23.
46. See LAWRENCE B. KRAUSE ET AL., EUROPEAN MONETARY UNIFICATION AND ITS
MEANING FOR THE UNITED STATES, supra note 41, at 114-15 [hereinafter Krause].
47.

Id. at 115.

48. Id.; HORST UNGERER ET AL., THE EUROPEAN MONETARY SYSTEM: DEVELOPMENTS
AND PERSPECTIVES 2-3 (1990) [hereinafter Ungerer].
49. The Werner Report documented the need for the total convertibility of currency, as
well as the elimination of fluctuations in exchange rates, and the establishment of parity ratios.
See Krause, supra note 46, at 114-15.
50.

Id. at 115-16.

51. See MICHELE FRATIANNI & JURGEN VON HAGEN, THE EUROPEAN MONETARY
SYSTEM AND EUROPEAN MONETARY UNION 1 (1992) [hereinafter Fratianni & von Hagen].
52. JOHN B. GOODMAN, MONETARY SOVEREIGNTY: THE POLITICS OF CENTRAL
BANKING IN WESTERN EUROPE 192 (1992) [hereinafter Goodman].
53. See STEPHEN ZAMORA ET AL., BASIC DOCUMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC
LAW 471 (Stephen Zamora & Ronald A. Brand eds., 1990) [hereinafter Zamora].
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an Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM). 1 Second, member states may
obtain short-term credit in order to intervene in cases of serious
fluctuation." Finally, the EMS embraces the European Currency Unit
(ECU) as the official reserve asset, and as the official accounting unit for
the EEC.56
Currency stability under the EMS is maintained by a parity grid
and a divergence indicator.,, The parity grid measures the performance of
one country's currency versus that of another." Desired bilateral rates are
set by agreement and function as reference points for parameters beyond
which currencies are not allowed to fluctuate. 9 If a currency strays outside
of the pre-set bands, the central bank of that country is required to
6
intervene.60 Thus, the EMS works as a pegged exchange arrangement. '
While the parity grid measures bilateral variations, the divergence
indicator measures the performance of individual currencies against the
weighted average of all the other currencies.62 If a member state's
currency diverges too far from the ECU, that state is required to adjust by
selling or buying its own currency, as the case may be.63

However,

participation among states in both the parity grid and the divergence
indicator is voluntary."
In the absence of excessive market pressures, the parity grid and
the divergence indicator have helped to stabilize exchange rates.65
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. The ECU is a unit of account that represents a weighted average of the individual
currencies of the member states. See John H. Works Jr., The European Currency Unit: The
Increasing Significance of the European Monetary System's Currency Cocktail 41 BUS. LAW.
483, 494 (1986) [hereinafter Works].
57. See Brian K. Kurzmann, Challenges to Monetary Unification in the European Union:
Sovereignty Reigning Supreme?, 23 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 135, 143 (Fall 1994)
[hereinafter Kurzmann].
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. If the currency of a central bank approaches the high end of its range versus another
currency, the bank must sell its overvalued currency and buy the undervalued currency.
Conversely, a central bank whose currency approaches the low end of the band must buy its own
currency and sell the other. See Works, supra note 56, at 493-94.
61. See Kurzmann, supra note 57, at 144.
62. Id.
63. See Works, supra note 56, at 495.
64. See Schluter v. Hauptzollamt Lorrach, [1973] E.C.R. 1135, 1161 (holding that
member states are not ultimately required to submit to the terms of the Exchange Rate
Mechanism).
65. See Kurzmann, supra note 57, at 144.
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Nevertheless, these devices have failed when intense market forces have
jeopardized individual currencies." For example, Italy and the United
Kingdom withdrew their currencies from the EMS in 1992 because of
drastic economic conditions.67
When the EMS was implemented in 1979, critics argued the wide
disparities between the economies of the member states would preclude a
workable system.61 These critics pointed to three possibilities as a result of
the economic divergences."9 First, they argued the system would rapidly
fail because it was not flexible enough to accommodate such disparate
economies.70 Second, the critics warned that the system would have a
deflationary impact, either by forcing countries with high inflation to
tighten their policies or by making it necessary to suppress the
competitiveness of all member states in order to sustain the weaker
countries.,, The third possibility was severe inflation might ensue because
countries with low inflation would have to import inflation from other
member states in the form of price supports and increases in their
monetary bases.71 Despite these risks, however, the EMS has survived and
currently serves as the functional precursor to the single currency.Y
B. The Maastricht Treaty of 1992
In December of 1991, an intergovernmental conference on the
EMU made its report to the Maastricht European Council.1' Input from the
conference was then formally incorporated as part of the Treaty on the

66. Id.
67. See Emma Tucker, Obligations of European ERM Members, FIN. TIMES, Aug. 26,
1992, at 5. Italy rejoined the ERM in November of 1996. See Angelo Tarallo, On the Road to
the Euro, THE BOTrOM LINE, Spring 1997, at 4 [hereinafter Tarallo].
68. For example, in 1979 the inflation rate in Germany was 2.7%, compared to 12.2% in
Italy. The dramatic disparities in inflation rates among EEC member states were partly
compounded by the OPEC crisis of the 1970's. See JACQUES VAN YPERSELE & JEAN-CLAUDE
KOEUNE, THE EUROPEAN MONETARY SYSTEM:

ORIGINS, OPERATIONS AND OUTLOOK 66

(1984) [hereinafter Van Ypersele & Koeune].
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. See Goodman, supra note 52, at 182-83.
74. See Roger J. Goebel, The European Union Grows: The Constitutional Impact of the
Accession of Austria, Finland and Sweden, 18 FORDHAM INT'L L. J. 1092, 1109 (1995)
[hereinafter Goebel].
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European Union ["TEU"] on February 7, 1992." Under the terms of the
TEU, the European Monetary Union is cast with other significant EU
institutions 6 as one of three pillars, which together uphold the European
Union."
The Treaty specifies three incremental stages for the eventual
changeover to a single currency.71 The first stage (now complete) involved
the enhanced coordination of economic policies among the member states
within the extant institutional framework.79 On January 1, 1994, the
second stage beganY0 This transitional stage brought a prohibition on all
barriers to the free movement of capital, not only among member states but
also with respect to third-party states. 8' In addition, restrictions were
drawn on government deficits; the European Monetary Institute was
formed and the eventual independence of each state's central bank was
prescribed.Y Stage Three is scheduled to commence no later than January
1, 1999, at which time participating countries will adopt a single monetary
policy and a single policy on exchange rates.1
Under stage two the key institutional change was the establishment
of the European Monetary Institute (EMI)." The EMI monitors the
European Monetary System; promotes the use of the ECU in private
transactions; and supervises the development of the ECU clearing system."
The EMI will also be consulted by the authorities of the member states on
monetary policy and will be authorized to issue pertinent

75. The TEU became effective on January 1, 1993. Id. (citing 24 BULL. EC 12-1991, at

7-8).
76. These include the European Union itself, as well as two other treaty-based institutions
known as Euratom (which coordinates nuclear energy policy) and the European Coal and Steel
Community (which coordinates matters relating to coal and steel-scheduled incidentally, to be
subsumed by the European Union in 2002). Id. at 1110.
77. See TEU art. G. The second pillar is the Common Foreign and Security Policy. See'
TEU art. J. Under this article, the European Council is to establish and administer non-binding
rules on foreign and security policy. Id. The third pillar is known as Cooperation in Justice and
Home Affairs. See TEU art. K. Article K concerns the coordination of affairs of justice. Id.
78. Goodman, supra note 52, at 202-08.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. See The MaastrichtAgreement on Economic and Monetary Union, 32 BANK OF ENG.
Q. BULL. 64, 67 (1992) [hereinafter BEQB].
85. Id.
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recommendations.'
If a member state wishes to hold foreign exchange
reserves with the EMI, the Institute is competent to manage the reserves as
the state's agent." However, the EMI cannot intervene in foreign markets
on its own initiative. 8
The EMI consists of the central bank governors from all the
member states, as well as a full-time President.8' The governors are fully
independent, but independence is not required for the central banks
themselves during Stage Two.8 ' The central banks are responsible for the
EMI's administrative costs. 91
Two significant events will usher in the third stage.
First,
exchange rates between participating currencies will be permanently
fixed.92 Second, the European Central Bank (ECB), with the cooperation
of the European System of Central Banks (ESCB), will assume managerial
control over the new currency. 93 The ECB will determine monetary policy
for the entire EU, and will be "empowered to enforce binding rules on
national budgets. "14
The chief objective for both the ECB and the ESCB will be to
ensure price stability. 5 The ESCB will also be charged with a host of
collateral duties. First, it will develop and administer a single monetary
policy. 9 Second, it will hold and manage the foreign exchange reserves of
participating member states.97 As a third matter, the ESCB is required to
facilitate the operation of payments systems." Finally, it must assist
competent authorities in the prudential supervision of credit institutions and
the maintenance of a stable financial system." Central bank governors
from the various states will serve as members of the Governing Council of

86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
The Maastricht Agreements on Economic and Monetary Union, supra note 84, at 67.
91. Id.
92. Because exchange rates will be locked, the ECU will no longer represent a weighted
average of the individual currencies. Md.at 64-65.
93. Id.at 65.
94. Goodman, supra note 52, at 203.
95. See BEQB, supra note 84, at 65.
96. d.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
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the ECB.' °° They will be joined on the Council by a full-time executive
board appointed by the member states. 01
The ECB and the ESCB are to be free from all external
influence.' °0 This policy of independence was designed to avoid the
administrative complications that would arise if the ECB were to be
accountable on an individual basis to fifteen national governments and
parliaments. 13 Instead, accountability is to be maintained through the
Although the
European Council of Finance Ministers (ECOFIN).' °0
ECOFIN President may not vote in the ECB's Governing Council
meetings, the President may participate and submit motions for
consideration. 0 - The ECOFIN Council may also discuss ECB objectives
with the ECB President, and may amend the ESCB statute to a limited
extent. '
Additional accountability measures include a requirement that the
ECB deliver an annual report on monetary policy to the ECOFIN Council,
the European Parliament, the Commission, and the European Council.I'"
Furthermore, members of the ECB executive board, including the
President, can be requested to appear at the hearings of certain committees
of the European Parliament.?0 Finally, central bank governors may freely
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

Id.
See BEQB, supra note 84, at 65.
Id.
Id.
Id.

105. Id.

106. The ECOFIN Council may not amend provisions which govern the ESCB's principal
tasks and objectives, nor may it alter the ESCB's ultimate independence. Id.
107. See BEQB, supra note 84, at 65. The European Parliament serves as a forum for
debating issues of concern to the peoples of the EU member states. See BERMANN ET AL.,
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW 66 (1993). The Parliament is considered the most democratic arm
of the EU, because its members are directly elected by the people. Id. at 68. However,
"although its role in the legislative and budgetary processes has grown, Parliament still lacks the
power it ordinarily would enjoy in a modern democracy." Id. For example, legislation is
proposed not by Parliament, but by the Commission. Id. at 66.
The Commission performs tasks commonly associated with an executive organ:
oversight and enforcement of policy. Id. at 57. The Commission's duty is to promote the
interests of the EU, rather than those of the member states. Id. at 58. Its areas of responsibility
include the administration of EU finances, external relations and trade, and legal actions against
member states for violations of EU law. See BERMANN ET AL., EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW
59, 66 (1993). The European Council coordinates the foreign policy of member states. Id. at
56. It is composed of the heads of state and the President of the Commission. Id. The
European Council submits progress reports each year to the Parliament, and sets guidelines on
the economic policies of both the member states and the EU as a whole. Id.
108. See BEQB, supra note 84, at 65.
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attend national parliamentary committees, either as representatives of the
Governing Council or in their national capacities. °0
During Stage Three, the ECOFIN Council will retain responsibility
for the choice of exchange rate system of the new currency relative to nonEU currencies, and for the central rate within the system."0 However, in
order to ensure policies consistent with the goal of price stability, the
ECOFIN Council must consult with the ECB before making such
decisions."' Exchange rate operations from day to day are left to the ECB,
which will initially control up to ECU 50 billion 12 for the purpose of
exchange-market intervention."'
In terms of macroeconomic policy, Stage Three embraces three
baseline principles: no excessive deficits; no monetary financing; and no
bailouts."' The ECB and the national central banks are prohibited from
offering credit facilities to Community institutions or to member states.",
They are further prohibited from directly purchasing debt instruments from

these institutions. 116
1. Convergence Criteria
In order to join the EMU, member states must conform with four
threshold criteria measuring economic performance."' First, the member
state must demonstrate significant price stability.", In particular, the rate
of inflation must be comparable to the three member states with the
greatest price stability. "9 Second, the financial position of the applying
state must be sustainable. '2
Governments with excessive deficits,
2
therefore, will not be eligible.' ' Third, the state must have adhered to the
109.
110.
111.
112.

Id.
Id.
Id.
This figure equates to approximately 65 billion United States dollars. Id.

113. Id. at 67.
114. See BEQB, supra note 84, at 65.

115. Id.
116. Id.

117. See TEU art. 1090).
118. Id.
119. The average rate of inflation of the applying state, as observed over a period of one
year, must not exceed those of the three best performing states by more than one and one-half
percentage points. Inflation is to be measured by the Consumer Price Index. Id. As of early
1997, the maximum allowable annual inflation was about 3%. See Tarallo, supra note 67, at 3.
120. See TEU art. 1090).
121. Id. The standards for budgetary performance are found in Article 104(c)(2) of the
TEU: first, the ratio of the actual or planned government deficit to GDP must not exceed 3%,
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fluctuation margins of the ERM for at least two years, without devaluing
against any other member state's currency." The last criterion requires
the applying state to maintain interest rates that are comparable to the three
member states with the greatest price stability for at least one year."2
2. The Changeover
The introduction of the new currency will proceed according to
four chronological checkpoints.1' 4 The first significant step is scheduled to
take place approximately one year before Stage Three begins. At that
time, the European Council will decide which countries qualify for the
EMU based on the convergence criteria.'12 Second, as Stage Three begins,
the exchange rates between member states will be replaced by permanently
fixed conversion rates.'2 Functionally, the new currency (to be known as
the "Euro") and the several national currencies will be interchangeable.' 2
Only national banknotes will carry legal tender status until the European
banknotes are introduced.'12 The ESCB will then incorporate the Euro as
the central unit of its single monetary policy.129 Although the financial
markets are expected promptly to switch to the Euro, most private
businesses and individuals are likely to continue using the national
currencies for a longer period of time.'30
The third checkpoint is scheduled no later than three years after
Stage Three begins. The ESCB will at that point start to issue the Euro
and exchange it against the national banknotes and coins.'3' Finally, six
months after the Euro is introduced, the changeover will be complete for
unless either the ratio has substantially declined or the excess is only temporary; and second, the
ratio of government debt to GDP must not exceed 60%, unless the ratio is diminishing at a
satisfactory rate. See the TEU Protocol on the Excessive Deficit Procedure.
122. See TEU art. 1090).
123. The average nominal long-term interest rate of the applying state, as observed over a
period of one year, must not exceed those of the three best performing states by more than two
percentage points. Interest rates are to be measured in reference to long-term government bonds
or similar securities. Id.
124. See The European Monetary Institute, THE CHANGEOVER TO THE SINGLE CURRENCY
12, 13 (1995) [hereinafter THE CHANGEOVER].
125. This decision is expected to be made in early 1998. Id.
126. Stage Three is scheduled to commence no later than January 1, 1999. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. See THE CHANGEOVER, supra note 124.
131. d. The introduction of the Euro is expected to occur no later than January 1, 2002.
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all agents and operations.' 2 National currencies will lose their status of
legal tender and gradually disappear.,33
3. Developments Over the Past 18 Months
In December of 1995, then-British Prime Minister John Major
expressed serious doubts about the EMU, suggesting that the 1999 launch
date was arbitrary and unrelated to economic realities.1M4 He was especially
concerned about the relationship between the first wave countries and the
remaining states that will not make the initial cut.'35 "There is a risk that
this could tear Europe apart and destroy the single market ... resulting in
a situation where countries inside the EMU form a protectionist bloc
against [EU member states that fail to qualify for the EMU]. "136 Major's
remarks reflect the United Kingdom's reticence regarding the EMU, as
well as a pessimism that resounds throughout Europe. For example, a
1996 poll conducted by the Harris Polling Institute indicated that seventyeight percent of the British opposed the EMU, while seventy percent of
Germans, fifty-five percent of the French, and fifty percent of Belgians
were likewise opposed.'1 7 This opposition is not surprising, because
member states have implemented some significant spending cuts in an
attempt to close in on the convergence criteria.' 38 These cuts have had a
predictably harsh impact on jobs and welfare benefits. 3 9
Ironically, officials have noted that the EMU would help stimulate
the investment and growth necessary to reduce Europe's chronic
unemployment.' ° Former United States Ambassador to the EU, Stuart
Eizenstadt, explained the comprehensive effort that is necessary to mitigate
the shocks of transition: "Non-wage labor costs must be reduced, heavy
payroll taxes must be slashed, labor markets must become more flexible,
investments in job training, lifetime learning, and vocation education must

132. The latest date to phase out the national currencies is July 1, 2002. Id.
133. Id.
134. See Joe Kirwin, EU Leaders Summit Reaches Accord on Key Monetary and Trade
Issues, 12 INT'L TRADE REP., Dec. 20, 1995, at 2097.

135. Id.
136. Id.

137. See EU to Seek to Conclude Disagreement With Britain, BNA INT'L TRADE DAILY,
June 21, 1996, at 16 [hereinafter EU].
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. See Outgoing U.S. Ambassador Says Monetary Union Plans Moving Ahead, BNA
INT'L TRADE DAILY, Feb. 9, 1996, at 20.
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be made.""' Furthermore, it has been pointed out that serious budgetcutting measures by member states with large deficits were inevitable,
2
without respect to the convergence criteria of the EMU."
In order to boost morale in Europe, European Commission
43
President Jacques Santer proposed what he calls a "confidence pact.'
The central feature of the pact is the Trans-European Network, which is an
elaborate
infrastructure
of
transportation,
energy,
and
telecommunications.'" Santer and other officials are convinced this plan
5
must be carried out in order to compete effectively in the global market."
However, the cost of the plan, over a billion United States dollars, would
put a strain on surplus EU funds, which member states need to help pay
for deficit reductions.'"
In September of 1996, EU finance ministers met in Dublin and
agreed on two important EMU details.1"7 The first point of general
agreement concerned the formation of a stability pact for the purpose of
enforcing budgetary discipline among EMU participants.'
The pact will
establish an administrative council in order to impose economic sanctions
against EMU states that develop excessive deficits."4 9 Second, the ministers
agreed to create a new model of the Exchange Rate Mechanism that will
regulate currencies between EMU member states and non-EMU member
states.10 The new mechanism, known as "ERM2," will enforce a
fluctuation band of plus or minus fifteen percent versus the Euro.'5 ' If a
participating currency were to deviate from the maximum range, the
European Central Bank would intervene in order to maintain price
stability.52 Immediately after the Dublin meeting, Santer announced that

141. Id.
142. See Slow Growth Troubling, But Some Members Should Be Ready For EMU,
Commission Says, BNA INT'L TRADE DAILY, Mar. 7, 1996, at 18.
143. See EU, supra note 137, at 17.
144. Id.
145. Id.

146. Id.
147. See EMU Framework Pact Reached, Euro Said On Track For '99 Launch, 13 INT'L
TRADE REP., Sept. 25, 1996, at 1500 [hereinafter EMU].
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 1501.
151. Id.
152. Id.
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"[t]he EMU is irreversible and on track," in accordance with the timetable
contemplated by the Maastricht Treaty.'
Santer's optimism was supported by the recent publication of new
budgets by several EMU candidates: France, Germany, Italy, Spain,
Belgium, and the Netherlands.'" All of the budgets were designed to bring
budget deficits down to the required three percent of GDP." However,
despite the impressive budgets, not all of these countries are in good
economic health.' Belgium, for instance, has traditionally had a very high
public debt-to-GDP ratio--more than double the required sixty percent in
1995.,-" Elsewhere, Italian Foreign Minister Lamberto Dini suggested in
October of 1996 that the EMU launch date should be postponed until his
In the meantime, Italy has
country's fiscal situation stabilizes.' 8
implemented serious austerity measures to get its deficit under control, and
as a result bond yields for the lira compared to the Deutsche mark have
dropped significantly.", However, the drastic cuts and the tax hike in the
new Italian budget are likely to inhibit economic growth.160
There also appears to have been some creative accounting
employed in the new budgets.' 6' For example, France borrowed money
from the pension funds of France Telecom to pay for its budget, while
Belgium sold off gold.1"6 Economist Richard Reid cautioned that "[t]his
could very easily come back to haunt these countries after EMU starts
because then deficits could skyrocket again without making the really
painful cuts needed."'"6 Partly based on the newly proposed budgets, other
economists have projected that the first wave of the EMU will consist of
Germany, France, Austria, and the Benelux countries.'

153. See EMU, supra note 147. For details relating to the EMU timetable, see supra notes
124-33, and appurtenant text.
154. See Joe Kirwin, With EMU Expected to Happen, Attention Turns to Who Will Make the
Cut, BNA INT'L TRADE DAILY, Oct. 8, 1996, at 10.
155. Id.

156.
157.
158.
159.
160

Id.
Id.at 11.
Id.
Id.
See Joe Kirwin, With EMU Expected to Happen, Attention Turns to Who Will Make

the Cut, BNA INT'L TRADE DAILY, Oct. 8, 1996, at 10.
161. Id. at 10.

162. Id.at 12.
163. Id.
164. Id.at 11.
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On March 17, 1997, the EU finance ministers formally examined
and approved the German and French budgets.16 , Until recently, there had
been great speculation about the 1999 launch date because of Germany's
twelve percent rate of unemployment.'" After 500,000 German jobs were
lost in January, many economists doubted that the country could attain its
projected 2.9% deficit-to-GDP ratio.'67 By April, unemployment had
reached its highest mark since Hitler rose to power.'" Many experts are
convinced that, because it is the engine of the EU economy, if Germany
fails to meet the convergence criteria, the EMU will not be sustainable.1'"
Further uncertainty mounted in May of 1997 when a dispute arose
between the German government and its central bank.17°
The
"Bundesbank" objected to German Finance Minister Theo Waigel's plan to
place a higher value on gold and currency reserves as a means of
enhancing receipts to the national treasury.'7 The Bundesbank stressed that
this dubious accounting technique would damage the credibility of the Euro
and open the door for weaker economic powers such as Italy to enter into
the first wave of EMU. '7 2 As a result of this criticism, Waigel stipulated
that the revaluation would not occur until 1998.'17
In France, recent parliamentary elections forced Conservative
President Jacques Chirac to share control of the government with the new
Socialist Prime Minister, Lionel Jospin.174 This led to new speculation,
because Jospin punctuated his election campaign with criticism against
fiscal austerity, and suggested that the stability pact would not have any
authority to impose sanctions on member states. 171

165. See EU Finance Ministers Approve France, Germany For EMU Membership, BNA
INT'L TRADE DAILY, Mar. 18, 1997, at 3 [hereinafter Finance Ministers].
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. See Ian Geoghegan, EU Ministers to Meet on EMU, Cheered by Kohl, THE REUTER
EUR. COMMUNITY REP., Apr. 4, 1997, at 1.

169. See Finance Ministers, supra note 165, at 3.
170. See Jeremy Gaunt, German Gold Row Prompts EMU Jitters, THE REUTER EUR.
COMMUNITY REP., May 29, 1997, at 1.
171. Id.

172. Id.
173. See Jeremy Gaunt, EU Finance Ministers to Meet on EMU on Sunday, THE REUTER
EUR. COMMUNITY REP., June 4, 1997, at 1.

174. This so-called system of cohabitation requires cooperation between the ideologically
opposed leaders. See Paul Taylor, New French Government Takes Its Time on EMU, THE
REUTER EUR. COMMUNITY REP., June 6, 1997, at 2.

175. Id. For an explanation of the stability pact, see supra notes 147-49.
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Furthermore, the Socialist party demanded a significant shift in
EMU philosophy. 76 The party platform called for several conditions
precedent to EMU cooperation, including early membership for Spain and
Italy; flexible interpretation of the Maastricht agreement; a Euro that is not
overvalued; and a new European economic government.'" Speaking on
behalf of the new French Prime Minister, former Commission President
Jacques Delors announced on June 9, 1997 that France would seek a
protocol to the stability pact which will clarify how member states will
new currency is introduced-coordinate their economic policies after the
78
particularly with respect to unemployment.
French concerns were answered in part by the European Council's
adoption of a "Resolution on Growth and Employment," which is to
supplement the stability pact.' 79 The new resolution stresses sound
economic and budget policies, as well as sustainable growth and
employment.1'8 It is expected that the resolution will appease France's
insistence on job creation in Europe, where an estimated 18 million people
are out of work. 8 ' A report on the implementation Of the Resolution will
be submitted to the .European Council in Luxembourg in December of
1997. 92 In addition to the Resolution, the principal measures of the
stability pact include regulations which establish compulsory standards of
fiscal discipline for first-wave countries, and eligibility criteria for the
1 83
other non-EMU member states.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. See Myra MacDonald, France Seeks Protocol to EMU Budget Pact, THE REUTER
EUR. COMMUNITY REP., June 9, 1997, at 1. By June of 1997, unemployment in France had
reached a record 12.8%. See Commissioner De Silguy Opposes French EMU Delay, THE
REUTER EUR. COMMUNITY REP., June 10, 1997, at 1.

179. The details were finalized by the EU Finance Ministers in Amsterdam on June 16,
1997, as part of an intergovernmental conference. See Peter O'Donnell et al., European
Council, June 16/17, 1997: Summit Sees EU Stumble Onwards in Amsterdam, EUR. REP., June
18, 1997, at 5.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 7.
183. Id. at 7-9.

Beginning June 1st, the Finance Council will evaluate countries to

determine whether a country's deficit exceeds the maximum limit, and will make
recommendations to any offending country. The country then has four months to act. If the
country fails to act, one further warning will issue. Id. After an additional two months, the
Council may impose sanctions under Article 1049(c) of the Treaty. The sanction will vary

between 0.2% of GDP and 0.5% of GDP for the first year of infraction. Id. For the second
year, the minimum will not apply, but the sanction will still be limited to the 0.5% maximum.

However, for the first two years, any money that the country must pay will merely represent a
security deposit, to be relinquished upon compliance.

If the country continues to violate the
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4. Costs and Benefits
The single currency is expected to bring a wide range of benefits to
particular classes of individuals. First, investors would be assured that the
competitiveness and marketability of exports would be immune from
Second, businesses would be able to quote
exchange-rate fluctuations.'
the risk of prejudicing their own profits.115
without
currency
one
in
prices
Third, consumers would have a superior basis on which to compare the
prices of goods from two or more countries.9'6 Fourth, tourists would be
able to travel throughout the EEC without having to exchange currencies.'
And fifth, bankers would be able to borrow and lend throughout the region
without any exchange-rate risks.Iu
Furthermore, the changeover is expected to produce a number of
systemic advantages. For example, the savings in currency conversion
costs are estimated to be more than ECU 15 billion' 9 each year, which
represents about 0.4 % of the EU's annual GDP.'11 The stimulation of trade
among EU member states is also likely, because exchange-rate risk
contributes significantly to the high cost of international goods
transactions. 9' Additionally, since uncertainty among investors is likely to
diminish, firms might not have to pay as much in risk premiums in order
to invest and raise capital.1n Reduced uncertainty could also lead to
sustained increases in income and decreases in the jobless rate.'9

standards in the third year, the deposit will convert into a permanent fine. Another deposit will
then be mandatory. Finally, where a country is beset by a severe recession, the Council is
authorized to make its decisions on a case-by-case basis, and to take into account "exceptional
and temporary circumstances." Id. at 9.
184. See MICHAEL EMERSON & CHRISTOPHER HUNE, Foreword to THE ECU REP. 11
(1991).

185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. This figure is the approximate equivalent of 19.5 billion U.S. dollars. Id.
190. See HUNE, supra note 184, at 32. There is some debate about whether the
disappearance of currency conversion costs would mean true savings, as opposed to a mere
redistribution of wealth. Most of the savings are expected to accrue from the elimination of bank
commissions. Other savings would result as corporations eliminate their treasury departments.
However, this in turn would imply an increase in unemployment. Thus, the notion of "savings"
can be a matter of perspective. Id.
191. Id.at 33.
192. For example, if risk premiums drop by 0.5% points, this reduction might eventually
raise income by as much as 5 to 10%. Id.
193. Id.
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On the other hand, critics have pointed out that the progress
toward the single currency severely hampers the ability of member states
to respond to economic shocks in their countries.'19 Member states will
also lose a great deal of their ability to exercise control over national
currencies as a way of influencing their individual economies. '9" The
abdication of control over monetary policy could result in serious harm to
an individual nation's economic well-being.'1" This is partly due to the fact
that exchange rate flexibility enables a government to choose inflation rates
in order to fight unemployment."
It has also been argued that trade within the EU may actually
suffer under a common currency.'The link between exchange-rate
stability and trade has been questioned, because trading companies can
hedge in efficient markets at a relatively low cost.'" Finally, opponents
note that, at least until the tax laws of the various countries have been
harmonized, tax breaks will not be available to counter economic
stagnation, as they are in the United States."
Advantages and drawbacks notwithstanding, the ascendancy of the
Euro appears to be highly likely. 01 Thus, contractual disputes may arise
where payment has been stipulated in one of the moribund currencies. The
next section anticipates this problem and suggests strategies by which
parties may avoid such complications.

194. Marc Dassesse, Selected Aspects of European Economic Community Law on
Investments and Acquisitions in Europe, 25 INT'L LAW 375, 390 (1991).
195. PAUL DE GRAUWE, THE ECONOMICS OF MONETARY INTEGRATION 42 (1992).
196. Martin Feldstein, The Case Against EMU, THE ECONOMIST, June 13, 1992, at 19
[hereinafter Feldstein]. According to an example posited by Professor Feldstein, if a U.K.
exporter were competing against a U.S. exporter for a French buyer, the U.K. exporter would no
longer enjoy any benefit from a devaluation of Sterling as against the dollar when U.K. costs but
not EU costs would have necessitated a devaluation. Thus, the U.K. would be forced to lower
prices and wages.
197. DAVID LAIDLER ET AL., EUROPEAN MONETARY UNION: PROGRESS AND PROSPECTS
155 (M. T. Sumner & G. Zis eds., 1982).
198. See Feldstein, supra note 196, at 19.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. See THE CHANGEOVER, supra notes 124-133.
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A PROJECTION OF THE IMPACT A SINGLE EUROPEAN CURRENCY
WILL HAVE ON MEDIUM AND LONG-TERM TRANSACTIONS

A. Contractual Problems Associated With Impossibility as National
CurrenciesAre Phased Out
For most business parties, who presumably wish to maintain a
good reputation in the international community, contractual difficulties
related to the changeover in currency should be easily avoidable. The
parties can either plan in advance for the new regime, or they can make
necessary modifications while their contracts are still executory. However,
the changeover presents some potential for abuse if a party should decide
to try to take advantage of the currency problem. This section imagines a
scenario in which an unscrupulous obligor seeks to be excused from
performance by raising the defense of impossibility. Following the
discussion of impossibility, suggestions are offered as means by which
parties may ensure performance of their mutual obligations without
disruption.
1. The Impossibility Defense
The doctrine of impossibility has long been recognized in the
United States.5

This doctrine holds that if an unforeseeable supervening

event renders a contractual obligation incapable of performance, the
promisor's non-performance is excused."' Impossibility is generally
divided into two categories. First, performance may be objectively
impossible if the supervening event has rendered the contract literally

impossible to perform. 0 For example, if a promisor is obligated to
provide sound equipment for a concert at Carnegie Hall, the subsequent
destruction of the building by fire would discharge the promisor's duty
under the contract.
202. See, e.g., Martin Emerich Co. v. Siegel, Cooper & Co., 86 N.E. 1104, 1106 (Ill.
1908) (holding that the continuing existence of a material object is essential to the contract; when
the object ceases to exist, performance becomes impossible); Siegel v. Eaton & Prince Co., 46
N.E. 449, 451 (II1. 1896) (discharging contract to install an elevator because a fire had destroyed
the building). See generally Christopher J. Bruce, An Economic Analysis of the Impossibility
Doctrine, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 311, 323-32 (1982).
203. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, § 261. See generally E. ALLAN
FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS §§ 9.5-9.9, at 700-37 (2nd ed. 1990) [hereinafter Farnsworth].
204. See, e.g., Mullen v. Wafer, 480 S.W.2d 332, 334 (Ark. 1972) (discharging an
obligation for personal services in connection with the sale of a business because the seller died
shortly after the sale).
205. For a Ninteenth Century version of this illustration, see Taylor v. Caldwell, 122 Eng.
Rep. 309 (1863), where the court stated:
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As a second matter, the performance of a contract may be
impossible because a supervening event has made the required action
illegal.0 Thus, if a retailer agrees to buy 200 dual-port videocassette
recorders from a manufacturer, and Congress then promptly outlaws the
possession and sale of dual-port VCRs, the retailer would be excused for
its failure to perform.m
In order to establish either objective or legal impossibility as a
defense, a party must demonstrate the following:
1) that an event occurred which rendered performance of a duty
impossible;
2) that the non-occurrence of the supervening event was a mutually
shared basic assumption on which the agreement was made;
3) that the supervening event occurred through no fault of the party
raising the defense; and
4) that the party seeking discharge did not implicitly or explicitly assume
the risk of the supervening event.
2. For Example
Suppose an exporter in Norfolk, Virginia "We Sell" enters into a
contract with a buyer in Marseille, France, "Nous Achetons" for the sale
of two million armor-plated moth balls. The contract is executed on
January 1, 1998. As part of the deal, We Sell extends a six-year term of
credit to Nous Achetons.
Nous Achetons in turn issues negotiable
promissory notes to We Sell in an amount equal to the price of the goods
plus the cost of forfait financing. The promissory notes are guaranteed by
Banque de Marseilles. We Sell then endorses its guaranteed promissory
notes without recourse to Fred's Forfaiting at a discount for cash.
Pursuant to the credit agreement, Fred presents promissory notes to
The principle seems to us to be that, in contracts in which the performance depends on
the continued existence of a given person or thing, a condition is implied that the
impossibility of performance arising from the perishing of the person or thing shall
excuse the performance. In none of the cases is the promise in words other than
positive, nor is there any express stipulation that the destruction of the person or thing
shall excuse the performance; but that excuse is by law implied, because from the
nature of the contract it is apparent that the parties contracted on the basis of the
continued existence of the particular person or chattel. Id. at 314.
206. See, e.g., Vimar Seguros Y. Reaseguros v. M/V Sky Reefer, 515 U.S. 528, 540-41
(1995) (observing that if a provision is illegal or unconscionable it is unenforceable).
207. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, § 264; Texas Corp. v. Hogarth
Shipping Co., 256 U.S. 619, 630-31 (1921) (discharging promisor's duties where a vessel
necessary for performance was requisitioned by the British government).
208. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, § 261; Farnsworth, supra note 203, at
700-37.
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Banque de Marseille on a semi-annual basis. In return, Banque pays Fred
in French francs. Banque is then reimbursed accordingly by Nous
Achetons.
Meanwhile, on January 1, 1999, the EMU is inaugurated by the
Luxembourg, Austria,
first wave of participating member states:
Germany, and France. Since member states are granted three years in
which to phase out national currencies, Banque can continue to pay Fred in
French francs during that time. However, in 2002, with nearly two years'
worth of payments still to be made, the franc loses its status as legal
tender. The parties are now in an awkward position. According to the
literal terms of the agreement, Banque has only to issue French currency
now stripped of its value. There is no doubt that scrupulous parties will,
on their own initiative, modify their contracts to allow for payment in
Euros, or perhaps U.S. dollars. However, it is possible that others will try
to use this chain of events to their advantage. Banque, for instance,
decides to continue issuing the French francs to Fred.
He
Fred sues in federal district court for breach of contract.argues that the parties agreed to consideration of actual value at the time
the contract was formed, and did not contemplate payment in a dead
currency. Banque concedes that it agreed to yield French currency of
actual value, but claims that its obligation to so perform has been made
Banque argues first that
impossible by the forces of the EMU.
performance is objectively impossible, because the subject matter of the
contract has been destroyed. It further argues that European Union law
has rendered its performance legally impossible.
Banque's defense will probably not be very persuasive. In raising
the argument, Banque should have no trouble with the first element of
impossiblity. It simply needs to show that the EMU changeover has
deprived the franc of any actual value. Negotiating the second element
will require some finesse. Banque will have to show that the parties shared
a basic assumption that the French currency would remain valid legal
tender. Fred will argue that they did not share such an assumption,
because it was common knowledge that France would join the EMU.
However, Banque might prevail on this point. The contract was executed
prior to the determination of which countries were eligible for EMU
membership, so the prospects for France's accession might not have been

209. Assuming no difficulties in obtaining jurisdiction. Note, however, that forfait notes do
not generally include clauses, which subject the obligor to a foreign jurisdiction. See Ludwig &
Coursey, supra note 16, at 387-88 (citing Tavernier, Legal Aspects of Forfaiting, 11 INT'L BUS.
LAW 25, 31 (Oct. 1983)).
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so clear. 2'0 Furthermore, the fact that Fred assented to the agreement is
strong evidence that he expected the franc to retain its value. The third
element will be no problem, because the advent of a single European
currency clearly was not attributable to Banque's conduct.
The final element of impossibility is where Banque's defense will
fail. Banque must show that it did not assume the risk that the French
currency would lose its value. The question of whether or not a party has
assumed the risk of a supervening event turns most on whether the event
was reasonably foreseeable.21 Here, the three-year obsolescence of the
franc was foreseeable for several reasons. First, the Treaty of Maastricht
and its progeny of administrative decisions had already put the world on
constructive notice of the changeover to a single currency. 22
Second, while France's eligibility for the EMU was not certain as
of January 1998, that country was clearly engaging in serious efforts to
comply with the convergence criteria. Thus, a reasonable business party
could have inferred a strong probability of France's accession. Finally, it
could be argued that, as a financial institution, Banque should have had its
hand even more firmly on the EMU pulse than would be expected of
ordinary business parties. Since the currency problem should have been
foreseen, the court will undoubtedly reject the impossibility claim, on the
ground that Banque voluntarily assumed the risk of monetary unification.
In order to vindicate the contract, the court will most likely use its
reformative powers to change the terms of the agreement and order Banque
to honor the promissory notes in the new currency.
Difficulties related to countertrade would in essence trace the same
pattern as the foregoing illustration. In the case of a counterpurchase
agreement, " for example, a German exporter may be obligated to buy
210. For purposes of this imagined scenario, the contract was signed in January of 1998.
Final determinations on EMU eligibility were not made until April of that year.
211. See, e.g., Neal-Cooper Grain Co. v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 508 F.2d 283 (7th Cir.
1974) (holding that government regulation was sufficiently foreseeable to preclude the defense of
impossibility); United States v. Wegematic Corp., 360 F.2d 674 (2d Cir. 1966) (holding that
problems with construction of a computer system were foreseeable); Eastern Airlines, Inc. v.
Gulf Oil Corp., 415 F. Supp. 429 (S.D. Fla. 1975) (holding OPEC oil crisis was foreseeable);

Mishara Constr. Co. v. Transit-Mixed Concrete Corp., 310 N.E.2d 363 (Mass. 1974) (holding
that a labor strike was foreseeable). But see Opera Co. of Boston, Inc. v. Wolf Trap Found. for
Performing Arts, 817 F.2d 1094, 1100-01 (4th Cir. 1987) (stating "[P]ractically any occurrence
can be foreseen but whether the foreseeability is sufficient to render unacceptable the defense of
impossibility is 'one of degree' of the foreseeability and whether the non-occurrence of the event
was sufficiently unlikely. or unreasonable to constitute a reason for refusing to apply the
doctrine. ")
212. See supra notes 74-116.
213. See supra notes 29-35.
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limestone from Malawi on a yearly basis for five years. Alternatively,
under a bilateral clearing agreement,z4 Austria may be obligated to pay
installments to cover its over-consumption of goods with respect to
Romania. In each of these scenarios, questions of performance are likely
to arise as the Deutsche mark and the Austrian schilling are phased out.
The resolution of these questions would very likely tend to parallel
the Fred v. Banque example outlined above, because they share the
common issues of consideration and ability to perform. Whether the
chosen financing involves forfaiting, counterpurchase, or a clearing
agreement, it is important for parties to consider and prevent the potential
difficulties linked to the new currency regime. The following subsection
suggests negotiating strategies for parties who, unlike Banque, wish to do
business in good faith.
B. Devising ContractualProvisionsto Avoid Litigation
Most conscientious parties will want to avoid Fred and Banque's
predicament by incorporating contract terms which anticipate the currency
problem. Any firm wishing to do business with parties in the EU should
draft special provisions to ensure a smooth transition. This is true even
with respect to countries who do not appear to be likely EMU candidates
anytime soon, such as Italy and the United Kingdom Such a clause is
simple to draft. It would only require words to this effect: "In case the
denominated currency loses its status as legal tender, the Euro will suffice
as a substitute." Alternatively, the parties may wish to arrange payment in
U.S. dollars, or some other hard currency. If these measures are taken at
the negotiation stage, subsequent disputes will be easily deflected.
If the parties fail to provide for the currency problem when the
contract is executed, there will still be plenty of opportunities to modify the
agreement. Assuming that the parties have no interest in ambushing each
other, they should be willing to reform the contract as appropriate. Once
again, a simple clarification about what constitutes acceptable currency
under the contract will do. Under United States law, no new consideration
21
is necessary, so long as the modification is fair under the circumstances. 1
VI. CONCLUSION
Forfaiting enables an exporter to ship capital goods to a buyer
whose credit standing may be obscure or non-assessable, by shifting
virtually all of the transaction risks to a forfaiter who buys the exporter's
214. See supra notes 36-40.
215. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, § 89.
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receivables without recourse. 216 The notes are secured by the guarantee of
a bank in the importer's country, who is primarily liable to the note-holder
for payment. t 7 The note-holder is then able to cash in the notes
periodically according to the credit terms. 28 In return for the notes, the
note-holder receives payment in the currency prescribed by the
21 9
agreement.
Other forms of medium and long-term trade agreements include
counterpurchase and bilateral clearing agreements. A counterpurchase
contract is a transaction in which one party agrees to buy goods from
another on condition that the second party promises to make a subsequent
purchase from the first.= Bilateral clearing agreements involve reciprocal
lines of credit between countries for a predetermined period of time."'
Along with forfaiting, these techniques help to facilitate international
commerce.
It is possible, however, that many of these agreements fail to
contemplate the implications of a single currency in Europe.2
For
medium and long-term credit agreements, the denominated currency is in
danger of a fatal changeover.Although scrupulous business parties
should be able to adapt their contracts to solve the currency problem, some
opportunists may insist that their duties are discharged by adhering to the
literal terms of the agreement. If one party sues for breach, the obligor
may try to claim that the changeover in currency rendered performance
impossible. However, this defense is likely to fail because the obligor
assumed the risk of the supervening event.

216. See supra notes 3-12.

217. See supra
218. See supra
219. See supra
220. See supra
221. See supra
222. See supra
223. Id.
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note 10.
note 8.
notes 29-35.
notes 36-40.
notes 78-83.

